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CASE COMMENT

Biotechnology and Recently Amended
Section 337: Federal Circuit Grants No
Protection, Amgen, Inc. v. United States
International Trade Commission, 902

F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
ABSTRACT

Section 337 of the recently amended Tariff Act of 1930 permits United
States patent owners to bar from importation goods that infringe upon
their patents. In Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, the Federal Circuit refused to grant relief to the patent owner
because it had no claim on either the final product imported or the process to create the product. The alleged infringer, however, had to use the
patented product to create the final product, which, if done in the United
States, would infringe the patent.
This Comment arguesfor an extension of section 337 to cover this type
of behavior, especially in regard to high technology products. For years
this industry has been the victim of multi-million dollar piracy and
United States corporations require this protection to remain or become
competitive. Fledgling biotechnology corporations, who depend heavily
upon patent protection, especially need increased protection to develop
and market their products.
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THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION'S
DETERMINATION

A.

Facts of Amgen

In theory, United States domestic laws should demand no more of
those engaging in business in the United States than they demand of
importers. Despite the rhetoric of free trade and open markets, tariff
laws and import controls may lead one to believe that the United States
trade laws favor United States citizens. In the case of high-technology
intellectual property, however, the converse may be true, as demonstrated by the case of Amgen, Inc. v. United States InternationalTrade

Commission.'
On January 4, 1988, Amgen, Inc. (Amgen) filed a complaint with the
United States International Trade Commission (ITC)2 against Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co. of Japan and Chugai Pharma U.S.A., Inc. (collectively, Chugai) for an alleged violation of former section 3373 of the
1. 902 F.2d 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
2. The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) is a six person board
appointed by the President to investigate customs' infractions. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332
(1988). Appeals from the ITC proceed directly to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, a federal appeals court established in 1982 that sits in Washington,
D.C. and hears several types of special appeals, including patent, trademark, and tax
appeals. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96
Stat. 25, 37-38 (1982).
3. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19
U,S.C. § 1337 (1988)). The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988
Trade Act) amended 19 U.S.C. § 1337 and repealed 19 U.S.C. § 1337a. See infra note
10. Prior to these 1988 amendments, section 1337(a), pursuant to which Amgen originally claimed relief, provided:
Importation ofproducts produced under process covered by claims of unexpired
patent
The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced,
processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by the claims of any
unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the same status for the
purposes of section 1337 of this title as the importation of any product or article
covered by the claims of any unexpired valid United States letters patent.
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Tariff Act of 1930.4 Amgen claimed that Chugai imported a product
that infringed Amgen's patent, United States Patent Number 4,703,008
(the '008 patent), which covered the DNA 5 sequences, vectors, and host
cells used to make recombinant erythropoietin (rEPO).6 No patent claim
in the '008 patent, however, actually covered the process employed to
synthesize rEPO.
B.

The ITC's Decision

The ITC commenced an investigation into Amgen's allegations on
February 2, 1988, referring the matter to an administrative law judge
(ALJ). Before the ALJ reached a conclusion, however, Congress, in
Augist 1988, substantially amended section 3379 and repealed the sec-

Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534 n.2.
4. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534.
5. DNA is an abbreviation for deoxyribonucleic acid, a chemical compound that
stores the genetic information and is found in virtually all living things.
6. Id. at 1533-34. Erythropoietin is a hormone naturally present in animals that
controls red blood cell synthesis. Because erythropoietin stimulates red blood cell production, physicians use it to treat patients with anemia. Through biotechnology Amgen
could mass-produce rEPO, thereby making it commercially feasible to use rEPO in the
treatment of anemia. Id. For details concerning the patent claims of the '008 patent and

the biotechnology used to produce rEPO, see Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,
13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1741-58 (D. Mass. 1989).
On a related issue, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorarito determine whether genetically engineered life forms must be disclosed fully in patent applications. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert.

granted, 42 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 240 (July 11, 1991).
7. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1533-34. A process patent protects the method for producing
the product, not the end product. In other words, competitors are free to make the end
product by another method. The Patent and Trademark Office refused to grant a process
patent for the production of rEPO because the examiner considered the process to be
obvious in light of the prior art within the scope of section 103 of the Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 103, In re Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906,
1910; the examiner also considered the process obvious based on the holding of In re
Durden, 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that no patent could issue on a process
that used a patentable starting product and yielded a patentable final product). Amgen,
902 F.2d at 1534 n.1. An amendment is now before Congress that would reverse the
holding of In re Durden. See 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 211, 212 (June
28, 1990) (description of the Biotechnology Protection Act of 1990). See also S. Res. 654,
102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. 53284 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini) (introducing the Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of 1991, intended
to revise and refine the proposed Biotechnology Patent Protection Act of 1990).
8. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534.
9. Prior to the 1988 amendments, Congress had renumbered section 337 to section
1337. The literature uses these section numbers as synonyms, and that tradition will not
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tion under which Amgen sought relief by passing the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Trade Act),10 which applied to
all pending cases." Amgen amended its complaint to allege that
Chugai's behavior fell under section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the 1988 Trade
Act, which bars from importation articles that "are made, produced,
processed, or mined under, or by other means of, a process covered by
the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent."' 2 Amgen
argued first that, to produce rEPO, Chugai had to use Amgen's patented
material covered by the claims of the valid '008 patent, and, therefore,
Chugai's behavior of importation was unfair.13 Second, Amgen alleged
that the host cell14 claims of the '008 patent were "unique hybrid
claims," which covered not only the host cells themselves, but also the
specific intracellular processes carried out by those cells.' 5 On January
10, 1989, the ALJ held that although the ITC had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, Chugai's process for rEPO production did not infringe upon the '008 patent claims, and therefore, no violation of section
6
1337 had occurred.'
The ITC reviewed the decision of the ALJ, holding that a process
claim was a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction under section

be broken herein.
10. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1107 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 2901).

11. Interim Rules Governing Investigations and Enforcement Procedures Pertaining to Unfair Practices in Import Trade, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,043, 33,044 (1988).
12. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534. The full text of section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) states:

(a) Unlawful activities; covered industries; definitions
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when found by
the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provision of
law, as provided in this section:...
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation', or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of
articles that.
(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or by means of, a process
covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.

Id.
13. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1534.
14. A host cell is a bacterium that has been infected by foreign DNA and is thereafter capable of producing the protein or proteins encoded by the foreign DNA. See id. at
1533. This genetic engineering technique has empowered scientists to produce large
quantities of proteins for which they know or have isolated the particular gene that encodes that protein. Id.
15. Id. at 1534.
16. Id. at 1534-35.
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1337(a)(1)(B)(ii).1 7 Because Amgen held no process claim in the '008
patent for the production of rEPO, the ITC dismissed the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction."8 On appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: vacated and remanded. Held: Subject
matter jurisdiction existed over the case, but nevertheless, Congress did
not intend for section 1337 to bar from importation goods made outside
the United States that used an article patented in the United States if no
process patent claim existed. 19
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Patent Laws

Currently, the patent laws of the United States2" grant to the patentee
the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the patented article within the
United States.2" A patentee's right to exclude others explicitly encompasses the right to prevent others from using the patented article,2 2
which includes the right to exclude others from unauthorized use of the
article as part of a manufacturing process.2 3 For example, in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 4 the United States
Supreme Court held that because the defendant used the plaintiff's invention without authorization by replacing patented materials, a claim of
infringement existed.

17.

Certain Recombinant Erythropoietin, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.

18. Id. at 1911.
19. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1540. Amgen, however, has received some relief in this case.
The Federal Circuit upheld Amgen's patent infringement claims against Chugai on appeal from the United States District Court of Massachusetts. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
20. Congress passed the patent laws pursuant to its grant of authority in the United
States Constitution: "To promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 8.
21.

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).

22. "Under the common law the inventor had no right to exclude others from making and using his invention." Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
525-26 (1972).
23. See Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 611 F.2d 156, 161, affd, 718 F.2d
1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (unauthorized use of patented machine constitutes infringement).
24.

377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964).
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The Tariff Act of 1922

In general, however, substantive patent rights extend only to the territorial borders of the United States.2 5 In limited instances, Congress has
extended patent protection internationally, through import laws, by
granting to the patentee the additional right to exclude from importation
6
articles that infringe certain intellectual property rights.1
The Tariff Act of 192227 provided the first statutory basis for United
States corporations to enjoin importers from engaging in unfair competition.2" The Tariff Act of 1930 specifically protected the owner of a valid
United States patent from the importation of infringing goods.2 ' In re
Amtorg Trading Corp.30 provided the impetus for Congress to expand
the unfair competition branch of the trade laws to protect patentees instead of the substantive patent laws, which provide a remedy only for
domestic infringement. 31 The Amtorg court held3 2 that importation into
the United States of unpatented goods, made by a process for which a
valid United States patent existed, did not constitute unfair competition.3 Thus, the Amtorg decision implicitly granted a license to competing corporations to have goods, which could not be made legally in the
United States because of a competitor's process patent, made outside the
United States, and then to import those goods into the United States.
Congress responded by protecting process patents explicitly.34
In 1979, Congress amended the Tariff Act again, and this broader
statutory protection dramatically increased the number of cases filed with

25. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
26. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
27. Pub. L. No. 67-318, tit. III, § 303, 42 Stat. 935.
28. For discussion of the development of the Tariff Act, see Ronald A. Brand, Private Parties and GATT Dispute Resolution: Implications of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, 24 J. WORLD TRADE, June 1990, at 5.
29. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 337, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (original version at 19

U.S.C. § 337 (1930)).
30. 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1781, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
32. Only one year earlier, the court had held that importation of products made
under a patented process constituted unfair competition. See In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d
458 (C.C.P.A. 1934); see also In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A.
1934).
33. Amtorg, 75 F.2d at 835.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 1781, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); see also S.REP. No.
1903, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940). The holding of In re Von Clemm demonstrates that
Congress successfully reversed the Amtorg holding. In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441
(C.C.P.A. 1955).
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the ITC in the 1980s. 5 This increase may have resulted in part from
United States corporations lobbying for an increase in protection afforded them by the Tariff Act of 1930.6 The revisions facilitated relief
for a plaintiff by broadening section 337's scope of protection and by
increasing the speed with which a plaintiff could obtain relief.3 7 Despite
these revisions, the ITC appears reluctant to grant relief to parties without an egregious case.38

Prior to the 1988 Trade Act, for a court to exclude the goods of an
importer, the plaintiff must have shown:
(1) that the importer engaged in an unfair act, and
(2) that the act had a detrimental effect on the plaintiff.3 9
Moreover, the President had sixty days in which to rescind an ITC order to exclude goods if policy reasons conflicted with the order. 40 The
1988 Trade Act, however, obviated the detrimental effect requirement.
Prior to the 1988 Trade Act, courts stringently interpreted the detrimental effect requirement, thus barring many parties from relief. In
Corning Glass Works v. United States International Trade Commission,4 ' the court held that although the importer's goods infringed upon
the plaintiff's patent, the imports caused only a de minimis injury to the
plaintiff because the expansion of the market for the product at that time
greatly exceeded production. Similarly, in Textron, Inc. v. United States
InternationalTrade Commission,"2 the court held that although the importer's goods violated the plaintiff's trademark, it would not grant an
exclusion order because the plaintiff's goods were not inherently

35. See H.R. REp. No. 1781, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); see also S.REP. No.
1903, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940).
36. Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual
Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAw 285, 289-90,

293-96 (1989).
37. At least one commentator has argued that these are the major causes. See Martin
B. Schwimmer, Note, Defining Domestic Industry in the Tariff Act of 1930: Removing

the Gremlins From Section 337, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 165, 168 (1987).
38. For an example of an egregious case in which the Federal Circuit granted relief
under the 1988 Trade Act, see Hyundai Electronics v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding the exclusion order barring from
importation certain erasable programmable read only memories (EPROMs) because the
EPROMs infringed a valid United States patent).
39. New England Butt Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 756 F.2d 874, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1985). See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1988).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 13370) (1984).
41. 799 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
42. 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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distinctive.
These cases focus on the market effect of an importer's action, not on
the plaintiff's substantive rights.43 This dichotomy underlies the tension
between the monopoly granted to a patentee by the patent laws and the
public's interest in a free market. 44 Congress, however, has relaxed the
Tariff Act's requirements by deleting the need for an industry to be "efficiently and economically operated" and by expanding the definition of
45
"industry" in the 1988 Trade Act.
Congress clearly has the power to close the United States borders to
foreign goods. 46 Moreover, the legislative history of the Tariff Act of
1930 underscores the congressional intent to protect domestic industries

from unfair acts of importers.47 Congress passed the 1988 Trade Act to
extend this protection. By holding importers, sellers, and users potentially liable as infringers, Congress achieved this protection, which both
increases the jurisdiction of courts and provides incentives for importers
to leverage manufacturers to avail themselves of United States jurisdiction for possible infringement suits. 49 Further evidence of congressional
intent to expand protection of patentees can be found in the Process Patent Protection Act of 1988,50 which amended the Patent Act.5 1 Congress
made its intent to increase protection for United States patentees clear in
the stated policy behind the Trade Act of 1988: "(1) to reduce substantially U.S. trade and current account deficits; [and] (2) to seek by 1992
more consistent equilibrium in such accounts." 52 Two of the enumerated
43. The converse argument is that a patentee's monopoly is a matter of legislative
grace and may be altered by Congress as it sees fit.
44. The public interest may be to obtain the goods as cheaply as possible in open
trade. This interest, however, often conflicts with the patent law's policy to grant a monopoly to the inventor, which in turn encourages inventions.
45. 19 U.S.C § 1337(a) (1988). The industry, however, must exist or be in the process of being established. Id. § 1337(a)(2).
46. See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (importation is not a vested
right). Moreover, courts have rejected constitutional challenges to the authority of Congress to regulate importation. See, e.g., Sealed Air Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that domestic industries may be protected from unfair competition by Congress under its plenary power grant in Article I,

Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution).
47. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 515-16 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1548-49.
49. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
50. 1988 Trade Act, supra note 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2118-2126
(amending 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271, 287 (1988)).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 2 7 1(g) (1988).
52. H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 515 (1988), reprinted in 1988

1991]

BIOTECHNOLOGY AND AMENDED SECTION 337

purposes of the act were "to strengthen U.S. trade laws" and "to improve management of U.S. trade strategy.155 Furthermore, Congress
stated that "the existing protection under section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930 against unfair trade practices is cumbersome and costly and has not
provided United States owners of intellectual property rights with adequate protection against foreign companies violating such rights."' ' Congressional intent to expand the substantive rights of a patentee could not
have been more explicit, especially in regard to the high-technology area
of intellectual property.
C.

The GATT

Related to the amendment of the Tariff Act of 1930, a proposal has
been made recently 5 to expand the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT)5 6 to include specific regulations for intellectual property.5 7 The pressure in the United States for this inclusion again comes
from corporate owners of patents, and owners of other forms of intellec-

tual property, in need of stronger protection.'

Notwithstanding the

GATT's failure to cover intellectual property, many foreign states maintain that section 337 violates the GATT's provisions mandating "identi-

cal procedures and standards." 59 Indeed, section 337 has been declared
inconsistent with the GATT provision on non-discrimination,"

yet the

U.S.C.C.A.N. 1548.
53. Id. at 1549.
54. 134 CONG. REc. 5579 (daily ed. July 13, 1988).
55. 134 CONG. REc. S10711, S10714 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg). See Mark Modak-Truran, Comment, Section 337 and Gatt in the Akzo
Controversy: A Pre- and Post-Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act Analysis, 9 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 382, 389 (1988).
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
57. Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 36, at 285-86.
58. Id. at 293-94. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
March 20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, protects patents to a lesser
degree. Id. at 294. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
59. "The European Community, Japan, Canada, and South Korea all joined in a
GATT complaint against section 337." Kastenmeier & Beier, supra note 34, at 298. See
also EC Endorses Panel's Ruling That § 337 Violates GATT Non-Discrimination
Rules, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 302 (Feb. 2, 1989).
60. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Decision: GATT Dispute Settlement Panel: United
States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 274, 274 (1990). The
Panel held that section 337 conflicted with the nondiscrimination clause of GATT in
article 111-4. Id. One commentator has argued that the reason section 337 has withstood
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Federal Circuit has rejected challenges to section 337 on this ground.6 '
At least one court has noted that Congress passed the 1988 Trade Act
to conform the United States trade laws to the GATT requirements.
The Federal Circuit in PPG Industries v. United States6 2 stated that
one of the motives behind the 1979 Trade Act's amendments to the
Tariff Act of 1930 was "the [c]ongressional purpose of conforming our
law with GATT."6 3
The amendments to the Tariff Act of 1922 and the legislative history
of section 337 reveal a clear and deliberate plan to protect all forms of
intellectual property, particularly the high-technology forms, which includes the biotechnology industry. Although some conflicting evidence
exists concerning the potential problems between section 337 and the
GATT, little doubt exists that United States high-technology corporations need more protection than they currently receive.
III.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION

The Federal Circuit described the issues on appeal in the instant case
as follows:
(1) whether the ITC's decision that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Amgen's patent contained no process claim was appealable
as a final determination;
(2) whether subject matter jurisdiction existed where Amgen's patent
contained no process claims in a section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) complaint;
(3) whether patent claims covering host cells are unique in a process
patent context; and
(4) whether the importation of goods made by a process that used patented material violated section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Tariff Act. 4
First, the court held that the ITC's dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction was essentially a dismissal on the merits.6 5 The court
the scrutiny of the GATT member states is that the industry requirement has been so
difficult to meet. Michael Stein, Comments on Section 337 Amendments, in 1 LAWS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, para. 211.22 (William A. Hancock ed., 1991). After the 1988
Trade Act, however, the industry requirement can be met more easily. See supra notes
34-38 and accompanying text.
61. Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir.
1986). See also Modak-Truran, supra note 55, at 383-84, 398-404 (description and cri-

tique of Akzo).
62. 928 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
63. Id. at 1575. See generally Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39,
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. (93 Stat.) 144.
64. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1532.

65.

Id. at 1535.
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adopted Amgen's argument that the ITC's decision was intrinsically a
decision to deny its motion to exclude Chugai's material from entry and,
therefore, could be considered a final determination."6 The court stated
that section 1337(c) allowed appeal from a final determination.6 7 The
court relied upon Block v. United States International Trade Commission, 8 which interpreted section 1337(c) to require "a final [administrative decision] ...on the merits, excluding or refusing to exclude articles
from entry." 9 The Block court also recognized that a decision that is
intrinsically a determination on the merits is subject to appeal.70 The
Federal Circuit held that because the ITC found that Amgen's patent
did not cover any process claims for rEPO, the decision went to the merits of the case and could be appealed.7
The court also reversed the ITC's holding that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist.7 2 The court relied on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Bell v. Hood,7 3 which held that when a plaintiff makes
factual allegations sufficient to warrant relief in a federal court, the case
should be decided on its merits.7 4 Because Amgen's complaint contained
factual allegations warranting relief under the Tariff Act, the court held

that the case should have been decided on its merits. 5
The court then addressed whether Amgen's host cell claims were
unique. Amgen argued that section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) was not limited to
patents with "traditional process claims."7 6 The court stated that this
reasoning raised the question of whether Amgen's claims contained any
"non-traditional process claims."77 Amgen argued that because the '008
patent covered claims for the host cells of rEPO, these claims also should
cover the specific intracellular processes carried out by these cells leading
to production of rEPO. 7 8 The court cited Diamond v. Chakrabarty,9 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a patent could issue on
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Block v. ITO, 777 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
69. Amgen, 902 F.2d at' 1535 (quoting Block, 777 F,2d at 1571) (emphasis in
original).
70. Block, 777 F.2d at 1571.
71. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1535-36.
72. Id. at 1536-37.

73.

327 U.S. 678 (1986).

74.
75.
76.

Bell, 327 U.S. at 682.
Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1537.
Id.

77. Id.
78.

Id. at 1537-38.

79.

447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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living creatures, micro-organisms in this case. Thus, the Supreme
Court's holding8 0 that micro-organisms are a "composition of matter" or
"manufacture"
allows a patent to issue on them under the Patent
Act."' Amgen argued that the rEPO host cells constituted a living machine performing unique processes leading to the production of rEPO. 2
Further, because the '008 patent covered the host cells, the patent covered the unique 3 process carried out by these cells as a "non-traditional
8
process claim."
The court rejected the argument that compared a host cell to a machine, holding that although a patent covers the machine, it does not
necessarily cover the process carried out by the patented machine.8 4
Moreover, the Patent and Trademark Office's denial of claims for the
process of producing rEPO may have weighed heavily against Amgen's
construction of the patent claims.8 5
Because the '008 patent contained no process claims, the court worded
the final issue before it as "whether section 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) was intended to prohibit the importation of articles made abroad by a process
in which a product claimed in a U.S. patent is used, namely the new

host cell."" 8 Amgen argued that the court should construe the language
"a process covered by the claims of a . . . patent" in section
1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) broadly to include Chugai's behavior, which would
have constituted infringement had it been done in the United States."7
The court, however, held that the "plain meaning of the word 'covered' "
in a process patent context, "in normal parlance among patent lawyers,"
is a claim that defines a process.88
The court studied the legislative history of the language that had been
introduced into the statute in response to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision In re Amtorg Trading Corporation."' The Amtorg
court held that because nothing in the legislative history of section 1337
authorized the extension of the substantive patent law outside the borders of the United States, the importation into the United States of a
product made abroad by a process that was covered by a United States
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patent did not constitute unfair competition.90 The instant court found
that the legislative history of section 1337(a) applied only to process patents. 9 ' The applicable House Report states:
This bill is designed to correct the present problem which was created
when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the case of In re Amtorg Trading Corporation reversed its former decisions and held that the
importation of products made abroad in accordance with a United States
process patent without consent of patentee was not regarded as an unfair
method of competition.92
The court found no indication in either the House or the Senate Reports
that Congress intended to prohibit the importation of articles that used a
patented product during manufacture of another article.93 The court concluded that Chugai's actions were beyond the contemplation of Congress
when it enacted the 1988 Trade Act.9 4 Somewhat paradoxically, the
court noted in its final footnote that the decision of the ITC led to the
introduction of House Report 3957 into Congress, which called for
amendment to section 1337(a)(1)(B)Y5 After the court published its decision, the Industrial Biotechnology Association, which helped draft the
proposed amendment, 6 stated that "[t]he second section [of the amend-

ment] responds to the decision in [Amgen] ...by creating new avenues
of relief under [19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 271] against foreign use of patented genes, vectors, host cells, and hybridomas." 97
In March 1991, several senators introduced the Biotechnology Patent
Protection Act of 1991 to "correct[] the inadequacies in our patent laws

90. Id.

91. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1538-39. For the full text of section 1337a before the 1988
Trade Act amended it, see supra note 3.
92. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
93. Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1539.
94. Id. at 1540.
95. Id. at 1540 n.14. Part of the proposed amendment states:
(h) Whoever without authority imports into the United States or sells or uses
within the United States a product which is made by using a biotechnological
material ... which is patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer
if the importation, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such
patent.

39 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 279 (Feb. 8, 1990).
96. See H.R. 3957, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. E207, E213-14 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1990) (statements of Rep. Moorhead and Rep. Boucher); S. Res. 2326, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. Rac. S3107 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1990) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).

97. Role of Patents in Biotechnology is the Focus of Two Conferences, 40 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 211, 212 (June 28, 1990).
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that limit the patentability in the biotechnology field.""8 This legislation
would amend section 103 of the Patent Act by overruling In re Durden,
decided by the Federal Circuit in 1985.11 While this legislation would
have no direct effect on section 337, it would provide much needed protection for the United States biotechnology industry. Moreover, a possibility exists that patents received under this new section 103 would be
able to qualify for section 337 protection because importers would act
unfairly by importing a product made by a patented process.
IV.

THE NEED FOR REFORM

In a case of first impression, the Federal Circuit interprets section.
1337 of the 1988 Trade Act. The court interpreted the legislative history
of a subsection of section 13371"0 to apply only to process patents infringed by the importation of goods that could be sold within the United
States without direct infringement. This reasoning follows from a restricted view of the court system in the enforcement of the nation's tariff
laws, particularly in regard to high-technology products. Several factors
weigh against such a limited view.
First, Congress passed the 1988 Tariff Act with explicit hopes of
strengthening both the tariff laws and the protection of high-technology
industries." ° The Senate stated that one of its purposes in passing the

Tariff Act was to strengthen the current trade laws.10 2 Moreover, in the
intellectual property field, Congress specifically addressed the issues of
developing and strengthening the international rules and of gaining and
enforcing adequate protective measures.' These purposes seem to argue
for a broader interpretation of section 1337,1"4 and one commentator has
98. S. Res. 654, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REC. S3285 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
1991) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). The report discusses the difficulties of patent protection in the biotechnology field and underscores the unique dependency of the field on
this protection. Id.
99. Id. See also In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that no
patent could issue on a process that used a patentable starting product and yielded a
patentable final product).

100. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1988).
101. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
102. H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 516 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1549. But see id. at 1550 (one of the purposes of the amendments was
to obtain a more open market).
103. Id. at 1556.
104. One commentator has argued that the expansive growth of the importance of
intellectual property warrants more protection of these rights. Kenneth W. Dam, The
Growing Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L
LAW. 627, 628 (1987).
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classified the court's holding as nothing less than an endorsement of a
legislative "loophole."' 0 5
Admittedly, Congress did pass the 1988 Trade Act with the intent to
conform the United States trade laws with the GATT. With section 337
already suspect, at least from the perspective of several GATT memberstates, 06 Congress may have been in an awkward position to strengthen
the import requirements. Nevertheless, in the high-technology industries,
United States corporations need more protection than they currently receive. Whether this need creates a conflict with the GATT should be
07
discussed in a different forum--namely during GATT negotiations.'
Second, an expansive reading of the word "covered" in section 1337
would bring the unfair competition laws of the Tariff Act more into
conformity with current patent laws. A patentee has the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the patented item, for which it
owns a valid, current United States patent, within the United States. 08
One policy reason for granting a patent is to reward the inventor.' 0 9
This policy is achieved through a grant to the patentee of a monopoly to
make, use, or sell the patented article in the United States for a period of
seventeen years." 0 If importers can ship articles into the United States

that were made by using a patented article, then the importers can undermine the patentee's monopoly. While a "patentee exchanges full and
complete disclosure of how to make and use the new invention for the
protected right to exclude others from making, using or selling the
claimed invention,""' importers frustrate this policy by skirting the pat-

105. "The court observed that Congress did not appear to consider the loophole in
section 337(a)(1)(B)(ii), exploited by Chugai in this case, during its 1988 revisions to the
statute." Michael L. Keller and Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Patent Law Developments in
the United States Court of Appealsfor the FederalCircuit During 1990, 40 Ams. U. L.
REv. 1157, 1180 (1991).
106. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
107. Congress nevertheless should be concerned with the conformity of United States
laws to GATT mandates. If, however, corporations require the protection, Congress
should pass the enabling legislation, and then later, if necessary, GATT negotiators
could bargain concerning the problematic provisions. Moreover, according to a presentation by Robert G. Krupka, President Bush has stated that section 337 will not be altered
until issues pertaining to other GATT problems have been resolved. 42 Pat. Trademark
& Copyright J. (BNA) 133 (May 30, 1991).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
109. A patent monopoly "was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge." Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).

110. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
111. Walter J. Williams, TransnationalLegal Aspects of Biotechnology, 19 LAw &
TEcH. J., 2nd Quarter 1986, at 3, 10-11.
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ent laws through engaging in infringing behavior overseas and then importing the goods into the United States.
Another policy reason underlying the grant of a limited monopoly to
an inventor is to encourage investment in research and development of
new products."1 2 Assuming Corporation A must invest ten percent of its
profits into research for new products, Corporation B, which imports
products made by the use of a patented article overseas, does not have to
invest the ten percent into research and development. Corporation B then
can bring its product to the market considerably cheaper than Corporation A. Although this behavior may benefit the consumer initially, the
long term effects include deterring corporations from engaging in any
research for new products, a result that will hurt the consumer and
society.
A corporation's ability to behave outside of the United States in a
manner that, if perpetrated within the United States, would infringe a
patent, and then to ship the goods into the United States, causes the
same disincentive to corporations and individuals doing business in the
United States. This frustrates the goal of benefitting society by the encouragement of investments into better products. A recently declassified
ITC report estimated that intellectual property piracy by foreign corporations costs United States firms between forty-three and sixty-one billion dollars annually.1 13 Although the amount of money that has been

lost as a result of behavior like Chugai's is unknown, the loss undoubtedly has a "chilling effect on the economic incentives for companies to
engage in the expensive research and development of new technology.""1 4
Third, the extension of protection in the intellectual property field argued for here does have some clearly defined limits. The United States
patent laws are time-tested in adapting to new technology. Because these
laws have been in operation for over two centuries and have functioned
well, fears of mismanagement may be allayed. For precisely this reason,
the trade laws of the United States need to parallel the patent laws.
Importers should be barred from importing goods, which, if made in the
United States, would infringe a valid patent.
Also, the President has the right to rescind any order to exclude im-

112. Id. at 10.
113. U.S., Trading PartnersMust Step Up Efforts to Protect Goods From Piracy,
ITC Head Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 509 (Apr. 6, 1988). See also Edwin A. Finn
Jr., That's the $60 Billion Question, Forbes, Nov. 17, 1986 at 40 (discussing the financial loss of United States corporations due to intellectual property piracy).
114. Modak-Truran, supra note 55, at 382.
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ports if the exclusion is against "policy."

11 5

This presidential power acts

as an additional safeguard against abuse by the courts. For instance, if a
court's concern is whether an exclusion order would have international
repercussions, the presidential procedure should remove this concern.
The President's duty is to determine whether an exclusion order is
against policy; this determination is not the concern of a court. One commentator predicted continued deference to the executive branch because
of the intricacies of foreign trade and the quest for open trade.""' Moredecision to rescind an order to
over, courts cannot review the President's
17
exclude goods from importation.'
Although these factors support expansion of a patentee's substantive
rights, they fail to explain the instant decision. The court interpreted
section 1337 narrowly. Admittedly, if Congress intended to protect more
than a process patentee, the statutory language and the legislative history
do not state this intention explicitly. Support, however, exists in the
stated goals of the revisions, a logical extension of the trade laws, and the
proposed amendments to section 1337 for Amgen's argument that Congress intended section 1337 to protect more than a process patent.
V.

CONCLUSION

This case demonstrates the need for further clarification of the Tariff
Act of 1930. The 1988 Trade Act amendments may have clarified certain provisions, brought the import laws into conformity with GATT
mandates, and granted broader protection to certain industries. Hightechnology industries, and specifically the biotechnology industry, however, have not received the protection needed to combat intellectual property piracy.
The proposed amendment to section 103 of the Patent Act, however,
may provide part of the protection needed for the biotechnology industry.

This legislation would permit United States corporations to prevent the
importation of certain articles by using section 337 if they obtain a process patent that has a patented starting product and finished product.
This protection, however, may not be enough for a corporation in

115. 19 U.S.C. § 13370) (1988).
116. Jane A. Restani, JudicialReview in InternationalTrade: Its Role in the Balance Between Delegation by Congress and Limitation of Executive Discretion, 37 AM.
U. L. REV. 1075, 1086 (1988).
117. Duracell, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir.
1985). See also Young Engineers, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 721 F.2d
1305, 1311-13 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (court cannot modify original order after the President
has rescinded it).
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Amgen's situation.
United States trade laws should be extended to cover the kind of behavior engaged in by Chugai. To protect enormous investments in intellectual property made by United States corporations, the trade laws must
protect patentees to the same extent as the patent laws.
John C. Herman

